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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past 25 to 50 years, the discovery of the environment as a relevant object of debate 
has made a deep impression on normative political thought. Not only has political ecologism 
emerged as a family of genuinely new political theories, one that includes e.g. bioregionalism 
and social ecology, but most existing political theories, from anarchism via Rawlsian 
liberalism to religious and authoritarian traditions, have also re-invented themselves as 
theories embracing ideas like biodiversity, environmental justice, sustainability or 
stewardship. Only libertarianism seems untouched by the green spirit, and while 
libertarianism may not be a strong political force in its own right, in mediated forms it was 
and still is extremely influential. Left-libertarianism in particular now serves as a source of 
inspiration, for example, for many a theorist of justice, while right-libertarianism has not only 
influenced neo-liberal thinkers and movements (broadly understood) up to and including the 
present-day Tea Party in the USA, but also, in the aftermath of the Final Victory of 
Liberalism heralded in 1989, through discourse with free market advocates, on Third Way 
social democracy in Europe. While traffic in the reverse direction remained few and far 
between, (anarchist and) libertarian thought did have a considerable influence on green 
thought (in particular in the USA: think of Bookchin, Biehl and the social ecology school). It 
seems that left-libertarianism is in turn now exerting some measure of influence on UK 
environmental thought (cf. e.g. Andrew Dobson‟s 2010 Green Party Manifesto), and may 
eventually impact the more socialist version of green thought on the Continent. 
 
The present paper seeks to move some way towards removing this veil of ignorance covering 
the eyes of libertarians. It asks a question that precedes any discussion of what, from a 
libertarian point of view, humans can and should do with, or abstain from doing to, nature: it 
asks how libertarians understand and understood „nature‟ in the first place – both explicitly 
and implicitly. I shall reconstruct the libertarian interpretations of three concepts of nature: 
metaphysical nature (nature as the essence of things, the realm of necessity), biological 
nature, and human nature, i.e., that which characterizes and distinguishes humans as unique. 
 
One conclusion that I will draw is that libertarianism, be it classic right-libertarianism or 
modern left-libertarianism, is truly extremely shallow when it comes to environment, 
environmental ethics and environmental politics. A second conclusion is that this appears to 
be an accidental defect rather than a necessary one: there are no reasons why libertarians 
would not be able to develop a broad understanding and appreciation of nature, or a consistent 
response to the widest variety of environmental problems, a response that would be widely 
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regarded as „taking the environment seriously‟. That is not to say that there are no limits – it is 
quite unlikely that libertarianism will ever endorse humanity‟s return to nature and 
submission to Gaia. 
 
While there are no good reasons for the „doubleplusungreen‟ character of present-day 
libertarianism, there are fairly reasonable causes. Throughout the text, I argue that there is an 
environmental explanation: limited resources force libertarians to focus on the most urgent 
topics on the agenda of political philosophy, and important items are not necessarily urgent. 
But there is also an intrinsic reason in the green potential of libertarians‟ implicit 
conceptualizations of nature. Here it turns out that, while the sense for political correctness 
may lead one to expect that left-libertarians are at least potentially more sympathetic to green 
points of view, there is in fact a far more important explanatory factor – the difference 
between the New World and Old World experience of nature. 
 
 
A QUICK (AND DIRTY) GUIDE TO LIBERTARIANISM 
 
All concepts are constructs, communicable only by virtue of a shared interpretative 
background. The term libertarianism has several meanings, its use may therefore cause 
confusion. What is meant in this text by libertarianism is not what the term used to mean in 
(continental) Europe, and what it still means in many Latin language societies: anarchism. 
The meaning used here, as now established practice in Anglo-Saxon political thought, is that 
of a strand of liberalism that at times comes very close to anarchism but never crosses the 
border of actually and as a matter of principle rejecting „the state‟ with its monopoly on 
violence. 
 
There is a libertarian canon, overlapping mostly with that of classical liberalism: Locke 
(1924/1690) is an example for many, as is the Adam Smith of The Wealth of Nations 
(1974/1776), rather than the Smith of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1984/1759), and as is 
Herbert Spencer (1969/1884). More recent, widely acknowledged sources of inspiration for 
libertarians are the founding fathers of the Austrian school in economics, Friedrick von Hayek 
(1899-1992) and Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973). Note that the classical inspiration does not 
mean that libertarianism is identical with classical liberalism; libertarianism embraces both 
anarchocapitalism rejecting any state formation and state-minimalists like Nozick – plus 
anything in between. 
 
Central to libertarianism is, as Peter Vallentyne (2007:187) put it, a „concern for individual 
liberty‟, or more precisely individual self-determination above all else, which implies a 
central role in any cooperative venture including the state for the notion of consent (actual or 
rational, whichever protects autonomy most). While (most) libertarians can justify the state as 
a necessary instrument for the protection of the rights of individuals, unlike anarchists who 
are less worried by the wickedness of man,
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 they share with anarchists the conviction that 
autonomy trumps authority every time – an idea best expressed by the anarchist author, 
Robert P. Wolff (1990). 
 
With self-determination comes the first of two more (in the present context) relevant families 
of tenets: most libertarians accept a version of the idea of self-ownership, ownership of one‟s 
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body and mind, including (mediated by the concept of self-determination) ownership of the 
work of that body (no more and no less). Tied to this is what the late, great Gerald Cohen 
(1941-2009) called world-ownership, or at least ownership of – with a biblical term – the 
fruits of one‟s labour, understood as a kind of fair desert, a reward for autonomous ambition 
and activity, while the absence of such blessings is seen as punishment for inactivity, laziness 
or irrationality.  
 
Note that there is, within this group of „Lockean‟ or „proprietarian‟ libertarians,  dissent over 
the role and meaning of „mixing labour‟: some accept Locke or merely amend his theory on 
this point, others, confronted with the obvious problem of borders and limits (touch the sea 
and own all water? Breathe once and own all air?), have abandoned Locke (e.g. Feser 2005), 
although they do  stick to the idea that private property rights are the central object of 
libertarian thought.
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Two further topics on which libertarians are ever more fundamentally divided are initial 
ownership and ethical foundations. The question of initial ownership distinguishes right- from 
left-libertarians. While right-libertarians (e.g. Robert Nozick, Jan Narveson, Ayn Rand, 
Murray Rothbard, Hans-Hermann Hoppe) hold that nature, prior to initial acquisition by the 
working man, was no one‟s property, the distinguishing mark of left-libertarianism (e.g. 
Michael Otsuka, Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, Philippe van Parijs) is that it thinks of nature 
as the collective property of all humanity or those in a given area (Otsuka 2003, also cf. 
Wissenburg 2010). Thanks to this assumption, left-libertarians can express their „robust 
concern for material equality‟ (Vallentyne 2007:187) in the form of a limited redistribution of 
the fruits of labour to the advantage of those deprived of opportunities by any individual‟s 
initial acquisition. 
 
Finally, there are deontological
4
 and consequentialist libertarians. The distinction is as 
fundamental but less „hot‟ than that between left- and right libertarianism; the two schools 
hardly communicate. The majority of literature consists of „internal‟ contributions to 
deontological respectively consequentialist libertarianism. Examples of consequentialists are 
e.g. the classical utilitarian Miron (2010) and the Millian utilitarian Scriven (1997). 
Deontologists include Murray Rothbard (2002, 2006) and the face of libertarianism, Robert 
Nozick (1974), but also Michael Otsuka (2003) and Hillel Steiner (1994). Deontological 
libertarians typically formulate their views in terms of rights: civil rights which they defend 
not merely as legal rights (i.e., based on democratic whim or dubious elite decision making) 
but, overruling any positive law, as first and foremost natural rights (Rothbard 2002, 2006; 
Otsuka 2003).  
 
Note that the traditional third school in ethics, virtue ethics, seems absent – but it is not: there 
is Ayn Rand (1905-1982), for instance, and more recently Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991), 
who defended a broadly Aristotelian foundation for natural rights. The absence of virtue 
ethics or teleology is not so strange, however, partly because libertarianism is a political not 
individual philosophy, and partly because teleology seems to be at odds with the notion of 
self-determination. 
 
                                                     
3
 Also note (as Daniel Mishori reminded me) that the Lockean theory of original acquisition relates to 
privatization of „commons‟, not „unowned nature‟ – more consistent with left- than right-libertarianism (cf. 
Wissenburg 2010). 
4
 The term is misleading, since „deontology‟ refers to duties rather than the libertarians‟ favourite rights. 
4 
 
As remarked above, the environment is not a particularly hot topic among libertarians. While 
Murray Rothbard occasionally flirted with environmentalist political movements, others 
remained silent on or even (as we shall see below, in the case of Jan Narveson) hostile 
towards the green agenda. If libertarianism and environmentalism are mixed, it is almost 
exclusively to discus and promote prudent use of limited natural resources, the classic 
examples being Julian Simon‟s 1981 The Ultimate Resource (the extended and updated The 
Ultimate Resource 2 dates from 1996; cf. also Hadley (2005), Hale (2008), Pasour (1979), 
Purdy (2005) and Sheard (2007)). There is only one monograph seriously addressing the 
compatibility of libertarianism and shades of environmentalism: Tal Scriven‟s Wrongness, 
Wisdom and Wilderness (1997), a rule-utilitarian argument for extensionist anthropocentrism 
as a public (utilitarian) ethic and for ecocentrism as personal wisdom (for epistemological and 
ontological reasons.) 
 
And yet, nature plays a fundamental role in libertarian thought – no less than four 
fundamental roles, in fact. Understanding these roles may shed some light on the silence on 
environmentalism. In the next four sections, I shall discuss the libertarian reading of nature as 
a metaphysical concept, as that to which natural rights refer; biological nature as the origin of 
all resources, all
5
 artifice and all property; and human nature, both as that which qualifies 
humans as morally considerable and as that which would distinguish them from other entities, 
say, beasts and angels. 
 
 
NATURE: METAPHYSICS 
 
First, there is the nature to which the concept of natural right refers. As we shall see, this 
nature is more or less a dud – it basically stands for deontology as a meta-ethical foundation 
of rights. There is no link to medieval or older, more substantive conceptions of metaphysical 
nature or a shared essence of all individual things, nor to a realm of necessity (the apparent 
opposite of liberty), nor a realm of causation (Spinoza‟s natura naturans), nor, finally, a unity 
of nature of which human nature and trees and rocks are emanations (Spinoza‟s natura 
naturata). And that is remarkable, given the extreme popularity in libertarian circles of 
phrases referring to „natural rights‟ or „natural law‟. 
 
As said above, not all libertarians use the concept of natural rights. Those who do, however, 
seem to think of metaphysical nature partly as a negative category, partly as human nature. It 
is a negative category in that authors use it to distinguish their most fundamental values 
(universal (human) rights) from what they are not – and while the latter category is 
pinpointed, described, identified, the former remains merely indicated, vaguely sketched. 
 
One of the most widely read libertarians, Murray Rothbard, illustrates this well. In The Ethics 
of Liberty (2002, originally 1980), some 25 pages are devoted to the defence of „natural law‟ 
as the foundation of a libertarian ethics – or more precisely natural rights, which Rothbard 
sees as a special, modern, individualist interpretation of the classical, broader but too 
collectivist natural law tradition. Virtually all that text is devoted to explaining what „a 
rationally established natural law‟ (Rothbard 2002:3)  is not: it is not an attack upon religion 
and it is not a defence of any religion. It is in a footnote only that we find a positive 
formulation other than the non-informative description of following natural law as acting in 
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accordance with „right reason‟ (e.g. Rothbard 2002:7). Here, Rothbard borrows from Edwin 
Patterson: natural laws are „principles of human conduct that are discoverable by “reason” 
from the basic inclinations of human nature, and that are absolute, immutable and of universal 
validity for all times and places‟ (Patterson quoted in Rothbard 2002:3n).  
 
The human nature to which natural law refers is, for the most part, a purely mechanical, 
material phenomenon: the set of properties that, when an entity comes into contact with 
another entity, determines is reactions (cf. Rothbard 2002:9). What natural law does is that it 
„…elucidates what is best for man – what ends man must pursue that are most harmonious 
with, and best tend to fulfill, his nature‟ (Rothbard 2002:12). But by what standard can right 
reason determine if a principle or practice serves the good of a human? For Rothbard, 
ultimately anything and any reason goes: „…it is a man‟s right to do whatever he wishes to do 
with his person; it is his right not to be molested or interfered with by violence from 
exercising that right‟ (Rothbard 2002:24). 
 
We shall discuss human nature below; for now, what matters is the observation that 
metaphysical nature is redundant in Rothbard‟s work, as it seems to be for all „natural right‟ 
libertarians from left to right (cf. Widerquist 2009). To illustrate this, let us next consider the 
case of Michael Otsuka. 
 
Michael Otsuka is quite lucid: what he calls natural rights are „…rights that do not depend for 
their existence on any of the following: their recognition by the laws or officials of any state 
or the principles of any institution; the presence of any social conventions; or the fact of any 
actual contractual agreement to conform one‟s will to the dictates of the rights‟ (Otsuka 
2003:3; for similar positions see Nozick 1974, Narveson 2001). Nature is here the opposite of 
artifice, fortunately of a so specific category of artifice (i.e., only mentally existing 
conventions)  that nature can at least indirectly be identified as non-positivist morality, the 
rules for intersubjective contacts other than those based on actual consent or execution. Note 
that Hillel Steiner takes a similar position: „Being non-conventional, being presupposed by 
conventional rights, these non-created rights are not inappropriately termed natural rights‟ 
(Steiner 1995:228, his italics). 
 
From this point on, however, the „nature‟ in natural rights becomes vague. Do natural rights 
exist?  
 
For surely the injustice of murder, mayhem, or involuntary servitude is not contingent 
on the recognition of such injustice by the laws or officials of any state or the 
principles of any institution, the presence of any social conventions, or the making of 
any actual contractual agreement. (…) We do not need to make an enquiry into the 
conventions, practices, or institutions of the societies in which the Nazis or the Khmer 
Rouge operated, or the international laws and agreements that existed at the time, in 
order to condemn their atrocities (Otsuka 2003:3-4). 
 
How are we to identify these natural rights? In the case of Otsuka, who rejects as 
insufficiently robust the Lockean, Kantian and even Scanlonian hypothetical contracts (made 
popular by, respectively, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, and Thomas Scanlon and Brian Barry), 
the answer is „coherence‟:  
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…I believe that we need to engage in a familiar form of coherentist argumentation that 
appeals directly to plausible moral principles that embody substantive values to which 
we are committed. These principles also gain support from their ability to explain 
intuitions about cases and withstand the test of counter examples that appeal to our 
intuitions about other cases (Otsuka 2003:5). 
 
This is not the place for a methodological discussion – but one could argue that Otsuka‟s aims 
can be met equally well if not better in a Rawlsian wide reflective equilibrium, i.e., the 
equilibrium ideally reached after a process of „coherentist‟ redefinition between considered 
judgments of real existing humans, the inferences drawn by human-shaped computer 
algorithms representing the idea of impartiality, and the body of all existing human 
knowledge including all theories of ethics. My point is, one does not have to exclusively 
embrace Otsuka‟s methodology to be a libertarian; positions like Nozick‟s or Rothbard‟s are 
equally deontological yet more respectively less contractarian. This is also not the place to 
discuss the dubious enshrinement of coherence as a yardstick for ethics – while coherence 
may be appropriate in logic, its absence is not necessarily proof of irrationality in ethics, only 
of current insufficiency of evidence. 
 
What is important in our context is that, first, Otsuka cannot believe that our moral intuitions, 
the „substantive values to which we are committed‟ that serve as his meter for good and bad, 
are socially determined – or they would be further instances of „social conventions‟ (or worse, 
they would be biological dispositives pre-empting all ethical discourse). It follows, secondly, 
that Otsuka must believe there is a universally shared set of values among humans, buried 
deep inside our initially unexamined moral intuitions – making up at least a part of human 
nature.  
 
Our overall conclusion can be brief: where nature plays a role in – at first sight – a 
metaphysical context, it usually turns out to mean the opposite of convention or artifice; it 
offers an ethical foundation for libertarian political principles. One other way to read nature is 
as human nature (which we shall discuss below). A third reading is that of the realm of 
necessity (cf. Rothbard‟s mechanical universe), the existence of which is at worst neutral, at 
best positively valued since it allows the free to move around in a predictable, controllable 
universe where freedom has effective (cf. MacCallum 1967) meaning, where the human being 
can be a creator, not a slave to the unpredictable random forces of utter chaos. 
 
 
NATURE: BIOLOGY 
 
A second concept of nature present in libertarian thought is that of nature as a biological 
phenomenon. While all branches of environmental philosophy have generated or adopted an 
incredibly wide range of interpretations of biological nature, libertarianism has, so far, 
considered only the narrowest and shallowest possible options, as we shall see. 
 
Probably the most fundamental distinction in green thought is that between the deep and the 
shallow, or deep and shallow ecology, or green and grey, or (in politics) ecologism versus 
environmentalism (cf. Wissenburg 1993, 1998; Scriven 1997; Dobson 2007, etc.). The 
distinction between these two opposites in ethical, meta-ethical, action-oriented and political 
discourse is ultimately based on the partly biological distinction between nature interpreted as 
ecology, an interconnected and interdependent system of living and dead matter, versus 
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environment, the raw resources surrounding humans. Ontologically interpreting nature as 
(something similar to) ecology is a necessary condition for the ethical attribution of any sort 
of independent value to nature, i.e., value other than that derived from the meaning of nature 
as an object relative to a human (or possibly animal) object.
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That the ontological understanding of ecology is a necessary condition for its ethical 
appreciation does not imply that it is also a sufficient condition – obviously, and as illustrated 
by libertarianism. While only a few libertarians explicitly exclude the ontological possibility 
of conceiving of nature as an ecosystem, i.e., as ecology, it is clear that many reject the idea 
that nature might have intrinsic value, or objective value – or indeed value to anyone but 
humans. 
 
Thus, Hillel Steiner discusses environmental issues only in the context of obligations to future 
generations:  
 
You don‟t need to be an expert in statistical extrapolation to perceive the broad 
outlines of the threat many current activities pose to the eventual inhabitability of this 
planet. Nor, therefore, is it unwarranted to claim that present persons have moral 
duties to conserve the environment for their more remote descendants and to restrict 
their own standards of living accordingly. (Steiner 1994: 259) 
 
There is no real difference here with right-libertarianism. When Murray Rothbard discusses 
„Conservation, ecology, and growth‟, he not only equates „left-liberal intellectuals‟ with 
ecologists (2006:301), but also reduces the latter group‟s agenda to an anti-growth and anti-
materialism campaign („For the mass of the world‟s population still living in squalor such a 
cry for the cessation of growth is truly obscene‟, Rothbard 2006:304), plus a mistaken attack 
on the free market in the pursuit of an in itself commendable objective: the conservation of 
natural resources; even the fight against pollution is understood as relevant only because it 
concerns „protecting property in one‟s lungs, fields, and orchards‟ (Rothbard 2006:319). The 
same reduction of ecologism to resource preservation, using the same terminology, can be 
found in the work of other right-libertarian authors like Pasour (1979), free-market 
environmentalists Anderson and Leal (1991), economist Simon, who suggests nature 
protection adds „ambiance‟  (1996:191), and MacCallum (2003), and left-libertarians7 like 
Hadley (2005) and Sheard (2007). The evidence is indirect: the libertarians‟ thundering 
silence tells us nothing that excludes an understanding of nature as ecology, and little more 
about his attitude towards valuing nature as ecology, i.e. ecocentrism, than that it is apparently 
irrelevant or – in the case of Julian Simon (1996:565ff.) – misguided romanticism at the 
expense of human wellbeing. 
 
Jan Narveson is far more outspoken: „your particular faith, sensitivities or convictions cannot 
limit my property rights - I may tear down my house even if it is some famous guy‟s birth 
place, or even if it would harm “ecological integrity” or some such thing that we ordinary folk 
do not understand‟, and: „Environmental concern that extends beyond concern for humans is 
not a matter of right or wrong, but a mere matter of taste‟  (Narveson 1998).  
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Despite the strict, in the case of Nagel even fell, rejection of ecology as an ethical category, I 
should repeat that this does not imply that libertarians cannot think of it as an ontological 
category. Anything remains possible, from ecology as the omniversal Hobbesian war of all 
against all, via ecology as a basically mechanical whole, an aimless composite of interacting 
entities, to a harmonious system constantly seeking a new equilibrium. In fact, one libertarian 
even argues that nature should be conceived of ontologically as an ecosystem because it is 
more prudent, i.e. makes more sense of current ecological problems, and even though 
ecocentrism as a social ethics should be rejected, it still makes sense as a cornerstone of 
personal wisdom
8
 (Scriven 1997). Bruce Purdy moves even further away from the Rothbard-
Narveson „private conviction‟ line; he argues that thinking (ontologically) of humans as part 
of an ecosystem allows the development of a (moral and legal) notion of „ecological harm‟ to 
the individual‟s „right to undiminished ecosystems conditions‟ (Purdy 2005:34) – a position 
that seems to presuppose the left-libertarian dogma of initial collective ownership of nature 
(cf. Wissenburg 2010). 
 
The point to note is that reflection on the character of nature is simply not part of the 
immediate (political) agenda of libertarianism. The nature libertarians usually talk about is 
nature as environment, and even that usually only in a fairly crude way as the physical 
resources from which most or all artifice originates. In that sense, libertarianism is shallow 
even by the standards of environmentalism. The fact that some left-libertarians are willing to 
include in the category of natural resources such unorthodox resources as one‟s „unchosen 
germ-line genetic information‟ (Vallentyne, Steiner and Otsuka 2005:209; cf. Steiner 1994) 
and „talents and propensity for hard work‟ (Fried 2004:86) makes no difference here: even (or 
perhaps: even more so) on such a broad understanding of biological nature, it remains 
environment and thereby „useable‟. The cause (rather than reason) seems to lie in, again, the 
agenda of the libertarian community: if, when and in so far as nature has a key role, it is as the 
medium through which self-ownership, thereby individual liberty and autonomy, is 
transubstantiated into world-ownership, i.e., ownership of the fruits of one‟s labor.9 It is not so 
much that libertarians want or need to argue that nature has (only) instrumental value, it is that 
the question of nature‟s value is not what concerns libertarians in the first place (cf. Hale 
(2008) on the related Wise Use Movement). Their primary concern, the promotion and 
protection of individual freedom and autonomy, forces them to see nature ceteris paribus as 
instrumental, not by definition. 
 
Thus, we find a diversity of characterizations of biological nature in libertarian thought, which 
all come down to the same, crude thing: nature is just stuff lying about waiting to be turned 
into something useful. Rothbard refers to „natural resources‟ (Rothbard 2002: 31, 2006:308) 
or „raw materials‟ (Rothbard 2006:308). Otsuka, carefully avoiding any reference to their bio- 
or geological origins, speaks of „worldly resources‟ (Otsuka 2003:17ff.). Narveson equates 
nature simply with resources, only once offering a more picturesque description: „state-of-
nature real estate‟ (Narveson 2001: 93). Steiner varies between „land‟, „unowned things‟ (a 
category that includes but is not limited to the natural environment), and „raw natural 
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resources‟(1994:235-6). Only Miron, for whom the protection of endangered species includes 
the protection of their „habitat‟, conceives of the habitat of animal and human in richer terms: 
„Economic development can also deplete nonrenewable resources such as oil and coal, 
endanger plant or animal species, or destroy green space and unique natural settings‟ (Miron 
2010:71) – although this has no implications for the value of the environment. In that context, 
Miron believes like Narveson that it is all a matter of taste: „If markets do not protect such 
species, it simply means that society does not place that much value on their continued 
existence. But that doesn‟t mean that individuals couldn‟t pay a premium for their 
preservation, if they really cared‟ (Miron 2010:69). 
 
There are in fact exceptions to the general rule that the libertarian environment should not be 
conceived of only as morally neutral resources, with more substantive evaluations being 
condemned to exile in the sphere of private taste, where religion, art, sports and games 
already reside.  
 
One example of such a broader interpretation of the environment can be found in Ayn Rand‟s 
work. According to Gregory Johnson, in particular Rand‟s 1943 novel The Fountainhead 
depicts the natural world as having no intrinsic value, as „merely the stuff from which man 
creates values‟ (Johnson 2000:231 ; cf. Johnson 1999).  Howard Roark, the book‟s hero, 
describes it as „waiting for the drill, the dynamite and the voice; waiting to be split, ripped, 
pounded, reborn; waiting for the shape my hands will give them‟(Rand 1993:16). Nature is 
incomplete; humans perfect it – as a teleological Rand characterizes a house on a cliff: „the 
purpose for which it had been waiting‟ (Rand 1993: 124). 
 
While Rand‟s appreciation of nature (environment) as wilderness may (appear to) be 
extremely negative, it is still an appreciation of wilderness, not of dead or inanimate stock; 
wilderness is biology, geography and geology in the absence of active human design, control 
or intervention. This is definitely a more substantive conception of environment that that used 
in the self-ownership/world-ownership debate. It is all the more substantive since Rand 
contrasts wilderness with an alternative environment: an  environment turned into landscape 
or manscape (my term, not Rand‟s, I believe)  a human creation merging „nature‟ (non-
human-directed processes) with human artifacts to become an artifact itself, while its 
constituent parts may still – within the aesthetical and teleological boundaries set by the 
manscape – flourish in natural ways. Note that Rand‟s wilderness and manscape, as more 
substantive, less utilitarian conceptions of nature, also move beyond the classic oppositions of 
nature to agriculture and nature to artifice: nature is not so much subjugated or denied by 
human interference, by manscaping, as it is enhanced, perfected, realized. It is also worth 
noting that sentiments similar to Rand‟s are totally absent in Rasmussen and Den Uyl‟s 
(1991) work; their interpretation of Aristotelian teleology and human natural ends is devoid of 
any references to the idea of a life in harmony with nature – not as wilderness and neither as 
manscape. 
 
In an only slightly less literary style, Murray Rothbard expressed the same Randian-
Aristotelian sentiment when he used the image of a Robinson Crusoe stranded on a desert 
island and initially living as a fruitarian to explain the fundamentals of world-ownership: „But 
for almost all of his wants, Crusoe finds that the natural world about him does not satisfy 
them immediately and instantaneously; he is not, in short, in the Garden of Eden. To achieve 
his ends, he must, as quickly and productively as he can, take the nature-given resources and 
10 
 
transform them into useful objects, shapes, and places most useful to him – so that he can 
satisfy his wants‟ (Rothbard 2002:30). 
 
What the cases of Rand and Rothbard show is that libertarianism is not destined to embrace 
only the shallowest version of environmentalism. Yet whether in particular Rand‟s position is 
consistent (as has been doubted by among others Johnson (1999) and in a wider naturalist 
context Bubb (2006)), and whether alternative but equally substantive conceptions of 
environment, perhaps even some more appreciative of independent natural processes, fit in 
the libertarian mould, remains to be seen. 
 
 
HUMAN NATURE 
 
Human nature, our third concept of nature next to biology and metaphysics, plays two roles in 
the libertarian drama: one as that which characterizes humans and makes them morally 
considerable, the other (to be discussed in the next section) as that which would distinguish 
humans from other entities. In either case, human nature is understood as anything humans 
have in common as biological creatures, and as usual, libertarians do not discuss most of what 
characterizes humans but focus only on those propensities and properties that directly support 
libertarian political philosophy. That humans are mostly bald, bipedal and beakless is 
irrelevant because it cannot serve as a foundation of natural rights (for deontological 
libertarians) or of wellbeing (for consequentialists).
10
 
 
According to Steiner and Vallentyne (2007), libertarians have almost universally adopted a 
„choice-protecting conception‟ of the nature of rights: it is, in some form or other, the capacity 
to make choices that justifies the moral considerability of humans expressed through rights (or 
stakes in the „stock‟ of wellbeing). While that characterization is correct, it is also incomplete 
– choice is the lowest common denominator in libertarian theories of human nature. In most 
cases, the libertarian characterizes humans as by nature possessing individual autonomy, 
having personality or being persons (Barry 1986) – characterizations that combine choice 
with will, consciousness and rationality. 
 
Choice, Rothbard for example suggests, would be nothing without rationality: „And so man, 
not having innate, instinctive, automatically acquired knowledge of his proper ends, or of the 
means by which the can be achieved, must learn them, and to learn them he must exercise his 
powers of observation, abstraction, thought: in short, his reason‟ (Rothbard 2002:330; cf. 
Rasmussen and Den Uyl 1991:65). Michael Otsuka (2003) includes as part of humans‟ 
rationality, universal ethical intuitions that serve as standards for moral reasoning. 
 
Next to choice and rationality, Ayn Rand added „will‟. In Ayn Rand‟s work, man is 
characterized by „volitional consciousness‟, the combination of a will and a consciousness 
controlling that will (cf. Bubb 2006). Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991:71) seem to have this 
same concept in mind when they describe man‟s autonomy as acting „from his own 
knowledge and understanding and thereby [exercising] control and direction over his actions‟. 
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Finally, it is, if the attribution of rights to make sense at all, essential that (conscious, rational, 
willing, choosing) humans also have physical presence and power, that they have an actual 
impact on the world outside of their consciousness or imagination. In his critique of 
libertarianism, Siegfried van Duffel (2004) referred to this quality as sovereignty or „natural 
dominion‟; it is a necessary condition if rights are to mean anything (cf. also Barry 1986). 
 
How exactly human nature or the possession of these particular human traits implies natural 
rights is an entirely different debate for an entirely different occasion – what matters here and 
now is that they are supposed to be sufficient, first, for man to matter, and second, for man to 
matter to man. It is, first, the presence of choice, consciousness, will and rationality (all 
thought to be typical of humans only) that makes an existence worth anything to the existing 
subject. It is, second, presumably (as this would be consistent with the „modern‟, egalitarian 
conception of natural rights described above) sufficient to imply mutual obligations and rights 
in the sense that I should respect your existence in (say) volitional consciousness because I 
value my own and want you to respect that in me. „What is implicit in the Lockean and all 
natural law classical liberal positions, is the concept of an equal liberty – that the only moral 
justification of the limitation of a person‟s liberty lies in the existence of a like freedom of 
action of others‟ (Barry 1986:13). 
 
Libertarian literature is relatively silent on what else constitutes human nature, again probably 
because this might seem irrelevant, relative to the libertarian‟s primary political concerns. 
Thus, little or nothing is said on the genesis of preferences,
11
 on the existence of and mastery 
over the passions, on the balance between nature and nurture, on the relation between body 
and mind
12
, or on the distinction between basic physical needs and all further wants, desires 
and aspirations.
13
 In fact, the left-libertarian attribution to fortune (and to the public treasury) 
of talents, handicaps and genetic make-up suggests that for them, none of these random 
attributes are (or should be considered) even part of the essence of an individual. Human 
nature as an independent realm of causation (cf. Spinoza‟s natura naturans) is relevant and 
therefore explicitly discussed; but human nature as a biological or psychological consequence, 
the (pre)determined automaton part of us, remains a blank spot – to not even mention the 
notion of a unity of nature of which humans, trees and rocks are mere emanations (cf. 
Spinoza‟s natura naturata). 
 
Again, there is an exception. Libertarianism is dominated by deontological and 
consequentialist ethics, two schools which, while incompatible, exist surprisingly peacefully 
alongside each other, firmly convinced that the other‟s position is really just a special case of 
one‟s own (cf. Miron 2010). There is, however, a minority group arguing for virtue ethics or 
at least an Aristotelian naturalist anthropology and teleology as the backbone of libertarian 
political ideology. In the past, this group was represented by Ayn Rand (cf. Barry 1986, 
Johnson 1999, 2000; Bubb 2006); in more recent years, by Rasmussen and Den Uyl (1991:29; 
cf. Kraut 1997). In both cases, the flourishing of the human individual through excellence in 
his or her innate capacities or virtues justifies and (because) is best served by a libertarian 
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order founded on the natural right to property, thus guaranteeing maximum individual 
freedom and maximum room for autonomy and personal responsibility. „One is only obligated 
to restrain one‟s actions in such a way that the moral territories of others are not penetrated 
without permission‟ (Rasmussen and Den Uyl 1991:128). 
 
 
 “…THAT THOU ART MINDFUL OF HIM” 
 
What characterizes man need not be what distinguishes him from allegedly „lower‟ beings 
like animals – or indeed from supposedly „higher‟ beings like, in Kant‟s philosophy, angels, 
in Nozick‟s work aliens, or even robots – hence the title of this section: a reference to an Isaac 
Asimov novella in which two robots establish their moral superiority.
14
 Some of the most 
interesting contributions to libertarianism have been developed in order to limit natural rights 
(or moral considerability, or eligibility for inclusion in the calculus of wellbeing) to humans – 
with remarkably little success. 
  
Deontological libertarians prefer a „choice-protecting conception‟ of the nature of rights over 
an „interest-protecting conception‟ (Steiner and Vallentyne 2007). Under the assumption that 
only adult humans can make choices, the first perspective excludes the Easter bunny as well 
as biosystems, the weather, children and all other real-existing animals. There are, however, 
problems with the choice-protecting view. Not only is it built on an empirically dubious 
assumption (the Great Ape Project, for example, has called into question much of what we 
assumed distinguished us from apes), but from a philosophical point of view, so-called 
marginal cases also present one with fairly disturbing dilemmas. Finally, not all libertarians 
are deontologists. From a consequentialist point of view, where „the capacity for wellbeing is 
sufficient for moral standing‟ (Vallentyne 2005:403; cf. Vallentyne 2000), the interest-
protecting conception is the more obvious choice – but it is far less easy to limit interests 
(especially interests in wellbeing) to grown humans. 
 
The libertarian baseline position is to assume that it is self-evident that humans are rational 
(and conscious, and have a will, etc.) while animals are not. The natural rights that humans 
thereby gain protect them against slavery, forced organ donation, random killing and being 
used as cattle. Animals, on the other hand, can be legitimately conceived of as resources. Such 
is, for instance, Murray Rothbard‟s attitude towards sea life: „Even now there is a simple but 
effective technique that could be used for increasing fish productivity: parts of the ocean 
could be fenced off electronically, and through this readily available electronic fencing, fish 
could be segregated by size. By preventing big fish from eating smaller fish, the production of 
fish could be increased enormously‟ (Rothbard 2006:315; cf. Rothbard 2002:29ff.). No matter 
that fish will swim below the fence, no matter that we would rather eat big fish and no matter 
that all fish have to eat and most must eat fish – no matter what other empirical blunders 
Rothbard makes here, the point is: fish are livestock, humans are not. Human rationality (et 
al.) also has disturbing consequences for the status of children: „Abortion should be looked 
upon … as the expulsion of an unwanted invader from the mother‟s body‟, says Rothbard 
(2002:98), probably supported by a vast majority of non-libertarians; but the same premises 
and logic also lead him to conclude „…that a parent does not have the right to aggress against 
his children, but also that the parent should not have a legal obligation to feed, clothe, or 
educate his children … the parent should have the legal right not to feed the child, i.e., allow 
it to die‟ (Rothbard 2002:100; his italics). Equally strong though in practical terms usually 
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less radical positions have been defended by libertarians from left to right, like Narveson 
(2001), Otsuka (2003) and Steiner („…minors … strictly speaking … cannot have rights‟- 
Steiner 1994: 245; his italics). 
 
But let us focus on animals once more. Some libertarians, while remaining extremely 
skeptical about animal or species rights, admit the hypothetical possibility that they can be 
given „a clear legal and philosophical basis, and not just emotional expression‟ (Simon 
1996:457). As among others Graham and Nobis (2007) argued, the absence of the qualities 
and capabilities that make humans unique do not prove the absence of all interests, needs or 
(by implication) moral rights of animals. In other words, having reason to protect „choice‟ in 
itself does not exclude that „interests‟ are morally considerable as well. If libertarians however 
adopt the alternative interest-based view, a threat to humans immediately appears: even if 
interests are limited to an interest in wellbeing, and even if each non-human can and will 
experience far less wellbeing than any human, there still are far, far more mice than men – not 
to mention other beings with an interest in wellbeing (Vallentyne 2005). Then again, the 
choice perspective raises the question of our obligations to „marginal humans‟, those marginal 
cases of humans who temporarily or permanently lack either volitional consciousness or 
whatever other quality makes humans uniquely valuable. No libertarian would want to argue 
that man‟s natural rights cease the moment he drops into a coma or worse, simply takes a nap. 
 
Enter Robert Nozick (1974). In between the rock of marginal cases and the hard place of 
animal numbers, Nozick argued that the distinction between humans and animals is a matter 
of qualities, context and degree. Choice (rationality, volition, consciousness, autonomy) is not 
the only set of qualities that characterizes and distinguishes humans, and that justifies the 
attribution of natural rights. While (for example) sleeping, unconscious or comatose, humans 
have no „choice‟; yet we do not take away their right to vote and we do not abuse our 
advantage to (say) unburden them of their momentarily apparently morally unprotected 
organs because other qualities, other aspects of human nature give rise to other moral rights – 
in the context of sleeping, for instance, due to the continued capacity for sentience, a right to 
awaken; in all three contexts mentioned, due to being alive, a right not to be killed.
15
 Mutatis 
mutandis, entities possessing those same qualities have by definition the very same rights 
implied by that quality, be they human, tiger or gnat.
16
 While there is more to life (and to the 
nature of beings) than wellbeing or the quality of sentience alone – allowing for a weighting 
of qualities and a reduction of the severity of Vallentyne‟s paradox of mice and men – it 
remains true that human nature contains unique qualities, unique both for the species (which 
is not so remarkable: bats and blind fish have their own unique qualities) and unique in 
implying extra natural rights over and above those enjoyed by other species. 
 
Nozick admits that moral theory (not just libertarianism) is underdetermined when it comes to 
distinguishing humans. More research is needed, and that research will also have to find a 
reply to the question whether a theory allowing for more than one moral divide between more 
than two categories of animals might allow one „…on the other side of human 
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beings‟(Nozick1974:46) – Nozick thinks here of aliens claiming superiority over humans, but 
one could just as easily make the same case for genetically enhanced humans. 
 
Thus, libertarianism seems anthropocentric but on closer inspection the signals turn out to be 
mixed. There is a richer understanding of human nature at work in at least some libertarians‟ 
work than one limited to choice (rationality, volition, consciousness, autonomy) alone; human 
nature can include qualities shared with other entities – memory, identity, the capacities for 
morality, commitment and empathy, even life. For example, Ayn Rand, discussing the 
uniqueness of man (cf. Mack 2003, Bubb 2006), initially characterized „life‟ as the quality 
that imbues an entity with value, – a position that would, without further qualification, 
commit her to a form of biocentric ethics – while in later work she developed the notion of 
volitional consciousness as the sufficient condition for moral considerability, life remaining a 
necessary condition. 
 
Since libertarianism, especially left-libertarianism, can conceive of humans as biological and 
not just intellectual creatures, it is not irrevocably committed to anthropocentrism, but 
remains open to sentientism or zoocentrism (cf. Scriven 1997).
17
 It can understand humans as 
part of an ecosystem – Scriven argues that this is even the prudent thing to do – but it will 
always focus on the individual entity as a carrier of qualities that make it morally 
considerable; libertarianism can never be ecocentric. The capacity for mutation and evolution 
of libertarianism‟s ontological conceptions of nature is definitely less limited than that of its 
ethical conceptions. 
 
 
NATURE: LIBERATION OR NEGATION? 
 
The overwhelming impression one gets of libertarianism, if one sticks to the letter of the text, 
is that it has the shallowest of shallow appreciations of nature. There is no explicit 
acknowledgement even of the fact that nature plays so many fundamental roles, no analysis of 
concepts, no reflection where (most notably in the case of Rand) inconsistencies emerge. We 
have also seen, however, that there are traces of more substantive, more robust conceptions of 
nature under the surface: Rand‟s and Rasmussen and Den Uyl‟s teleological human nature for 
example, or the intuitively disturbing „annexation‟ by nature of genes and abilities in Steiner 
and Otsuka, or finally the „extensionist‟ movement towards inclusion of animals in recent 
years. A second conclusion then must be that the libertarian silence on concepts of nature is 
accidental rather than necessary. 
 
Above, I have already discussed one main reason for libertarianism‟s environmental 
shallowness: not every item can be number one on the agenda of any theorist or school of 
thought. Libertarianism, a first and foremost politico-economic philosophy, by definition 
focuses primarily on human political and economic interests. Hence the priority of questions 
of autonomy, freedom and self-rule, market and voluntary associations versus the state, 
natural versus conventional human rights. The liberation of humans takes priority over that of 
nature. We could call this – slightly ironically – an environmental explanation, since it a 
matter of prudent use of limited, slowly or non-renewable resources. 
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understanding of human self-interest, and for extending the circle of moral relevance to animals, as „greening‟ 
strategies for libertarianism. Both paths are open, consistent and compelling. 
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There is an intrinsic explanation too, however. Through the cracks of a „resourcist‟ discourse, 
in some authors (e.g. Rand, Nozick, Scriven, Pardy, Vallentyne) as yet underdeveloped 
substantive conceptions of nature became visible – flashes promising a potential for a more 
robust conceptualization of nature. What unites these potentially green libertarians is not their 
membership cards of the left- respectively right-libertarian movements: initial common 
ownership of nature or initial non-ownership is irrelevant. Instead, what unites them seems to 
be a „New World‟ rather than „Old World‟ understanding of (in particular biological) nature. 
 
Tal Scriven described the Enlightenment understanding of nature as a form of „red in tooth 
and claw‟ thinking: „… nature, as a whole, is devoid of any teleological ends; it is brute 
mechanism, holding no good clues about what we ought to value, and, furthermore, it is 
generally hostile to our legitimate goals as individuals and societies‟ (Scriven 1997:7). In this 
typically European, Grotian, „Old World‟ view, we recognize the discourse of strict 
environmentalism, of nature as physical natural resources waiting to be tamed, killed, cut 
down, dug up and made useful. Any value or meaning given to this nature is – to use a 
Narvesonian description, tolerable only as long as that conviction is professed in the private 
sphere as a personal taste and no more. This type of libertarianism is and remains 
anthropocentric, with really no room for duties and rights of nature and regarding nature. 
 
Scriven also described an alternative understanding  of nature, „…a distinctively American 
understanding of the significance of the wilderness experience and wilderness narrative … 
revered by a long line of thinkers … The wilderness experience is not a mere escape from the 
senselessness and fragmentation of modern life (…); it is an opportunity, to use an 
unfortunately tired phrase, to “find oneself”‟‟ (Scriven 1997: 185). American authors from 
Thoreau to Leopold have given voice to a nature that is not necessarily an enemy or a thing 
waiting to be used – the \Wilderness Experience:  
 
Everything has a story in the wild, and one that makes sense and has a meaning. These 
are not the stories of other times and other people fancifully burgled and fenced into 
the present. These are the stories of real living beings pursuing their own goods. The 
narratives of Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold are not those of long-gone tribal cultures 
but, rather, those of serious students of nature and of what science tells us about the 
interdependence as well as about the individuality of living things (Scriven 1997:188). 
 
It is this visualization of nature that shines through when libertarians focus, for a moment, on 
nature in  another context than that of property rights to be defended against the lazy, greedy 
and violent. It is through the extension of moral considerability to animals and the extension 
of the notion of (natural) resources to something more than direct, material, profitable needs, 
that other appreciations of „environment‟ can be moved from the realm of personal taste to 
that of public interest. The latter is now exclusively reserved for Narvesonian nature as 
resources – as if that „Old World‟ interpretation of nature is not just as much a mere „taste‟ or 
„preference‟ as any other. As long as their political agenda tempts libertarians to focus on 
resources only, no „New World‟ libertarianism-for-nature will be forthcoming, no liberation 
of biological nature from the bounds of necessity. Nor can we expect an answer to the 
question if an extended libertarianism catering to the interests of animals and humans will not 
ultimately allow, even necessitate, the negation or abolition of uncontrolled wilderness. 
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